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Is the Great Moderation Over? 
An Empirical Analysis
By Todd E. Clark
T
he economy of the United States was markedly less volatile in 
the past two to three decades than in prior periods. The nation 
enjoyed long economic expansions in each of the last three de-
cades, interrupted by recessions in 1990-91 and 2001 that were mild by 
historical standards. While it has proven difficult to conclusively pin-
point the causes of the reduced volatility, candidates include structural 
changes in the economy, better monetary policy, and smaller shocks 
(good luck). Many economists and policymakers came to view lower 
volatility—the Great Moderation—as likely to be permanent.
More recently, the severity of the recession that started in late 2007 
has led some observers to conclude the Great Moderation is over. The 
recession produced declines in economic activity steeper than in the 
sharp recessions of the 1950s, 1970s, and early 1980s. 
However, the occurrence of a sharp recession does not necessarily 
mean variability has returned to pre-Great Moderation levels or that 
the Great Moderation is over. For example, the recession may have pro-
duced a more modest rise in volatility that could be temporary. Wheth-
er any rise in volatility is more likely temporary than permanent will 
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depend on the cause of the rise in volatility. An increase in volatility 
due to structural changes in the economy or monetary policy might be 
permanent. But an increase in volatility driven by larger shocks might 
prove temporary. This article conducts a detailed statistical analysis of 
the putative rise in volatility and its sources to assess whether the Great 
Moderation is over. The article concludes that, over time, macroeco-
nomic volatility will likely undergo occasional shifts between high and 
low levels, with low volatility the norm.
The first section of the article shows that macroeconomic volatility 
has risen significantly in recent quarters, reversing much of the Great 
Moderation. However, compared to the Great Moderation, the recent 
rise in volatility was not as widespread across sectors of the economy. 
The second section examines potential causes of the rise in the volatil-
ity of the U.S. economy, focusing on shocks to oil prices, the housing 
sector, and financial markets. Based on estimates from a small macro-
economic model, most of the rise in macroeconomic variability can be 
attributed to larger shocks to oil prices and financial markets. Together, 
the narrower breadth of the rise in volatility and the evident role of 
larger shocks to oil prices and financial markets point to bad luck as the 
general explanation for the recent rise in volatility. The third section 
considers the implications for the permanence of the Great Moderation 
and the future volatility of the economy. 
I.   EVIDENCE OF INCREASED VOLATILITY
Many studies have now documented the Great Moderation (e.g., 
Blanchard and Simon, Kim and Nelson, McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 
and  Stock  and  Watson  2002,  2003).  During  the  Great  Modera-
tion, growth rates of real GDP were sharply less variable than in the 
1960s and 1970s (Chart 1).1 From 1960 through the early 1980s, the 
United States experienced quarterly GDP growth rates as high as 15 
percent and as low as -8 percent. Starting in 1984, the variability of 
GDP growth was much lower, as swings in growth became much more 
muted (Kim and Nelson, McConnell and Perez-Quiros, and Stock and 
Watson 2002, 2003).
More recently, though, the recession has produced sharp declines 
in GDP growth reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s (Chart 1). Growth 
plummeted to roughly -6 percent in each of 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q1. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  7
These changes in GDP growth suggest a rise in volatility back toward 
the level that prevailed prior to the Great Moderation.
While Chart 1 suggests an increase in volatility, it does not quantify 
the magnitude of the change, or the precise timing. For a more formal 
assessment, this section follows Stock and Watson (2002, 2003) in es-
timating statistical models that allow volatility to vary over time.2 The 
analysis covers GDP growth and a wide range of other macroeconom-
ic indicators for the United States. These estimates reveal a partial or 
complete reversal of the Great Moderation in many sectors of the U.S. 
economy. Appendix 1 provides similar evidence for GDP growth in 
the other Group of Seven (G7) economies: Recent events have caused 
estimates of volatility to move significantly higher in all of the nations, 
reversing much of the Great Moderation.
The statistical model
For each variable of interest (generically denoted yt), the statistical 
model used to assess changes in volatility relates the current value of the 
variable to past values and a shock that captures unexplained, sudden 
movements in the variable:
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The model captures the dependence of the volatility (standard devia-
tion) of each variable yt on the coefficients on past values of yt and the 
standard deviation of the error term. 
 More specifically, the model recognizes that shifts in either coef-
ficients or the standard deviation of the error term could change the 
standard deviation of the variable. A rise in the variability of shocks 
would lead directly to increased volatility of the variable. For example, 
an increase in the variability of GDP growth could be due to bigger 
shocks to GDP. An increase in the (non-intercept) coefficient values 
will also generally lead to greater volatility. An upward shift in the coef-
ficients would increase the influence of past values on the current value 
of the variable, making the variable more sluggish. As a result, follow-
ing a shock, the variable would more slowly return to baseline. The 
longer-lived departure from baseline would result in a higher standard 
deviation of the variable. For instance, an increase in the variability of 
GDP growth could be due to more drawn-out responses of GDP to 
shocks, reflected in larger model coefficients.
To capture periodic changes in volatility, the model treats the coef-
ficients on past values of the variable and the variance of the error term 
as evolving smoothly over time (from quarter to quarter). In turn, the 
model-implied volatility of the variable can vary from quarter to quar-
ter. In this section, the model-implied volatility is an instantaneous 
standard deviation. In any quarter, the instantaneous standard devia-
tion of a variable is what the standard deviation would be for all time in 
the future if the variance of shocks and the coefficients on lagged values 
of the variable stayed at their current levels.3
This section reports estimates of volatility (instantaneous standard 
deviations) obtained by fitting the model to GDP growth and a range 
of other economic indicators. All estimates are based on data from 
1960:Q1 through 2009:Q2. The list of indicators is broadly the same 
as in Stock and Watson (2003). Appendix 2 provides more detail on 
the statistical model and estimation methodology.
Volatility estimates
The statistical estimates show that the volatility of GDP growth has 
reversed much of the Great Moderation (Chart 2). The Great Modera-
tion produced a significant, fairly sudden reduction in volatility. The ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  9
instantaneous standard deviation of GDP growth fell from a peak of 
5.4 percent in 1980 to 2.1 percent in 1986. However, recent events 
have caused the estimates of volatility to move considerably higher.4 
The estimate of GDP growth volatility for 2009:Q2 (3.5 percent) is 
roughly equal to its level as of 1983. To confirm the statistical signifi-
cance of the increase in variability, Table 1 reports the statistically esti-
mated probability that the instantaneous standard deviation of GDP 
growth is higher in 2009:Q2 than in 2003:Q4.5 For GDP growth, the 
probability is 95.9 percent. 
Consistent with the findings of such studies as Stock and Watson 
(2003), the estimated changes over time in the model-implied standard 
deviations of GDP growth are driven primarily by movements in the 
volatility of the error term of the model. The estimated coefficients of 
the models have changed gradually over time, but not by nearly enough 
to account for the Great Moderation or the more recent rise of vola-
tility. Instead, the swings in volatility shown in Chart 2 are driven by 
movements in the standard deviation of the shock term of the model.
Further analysis of sectors of the U.S. economy may prove helpful 
to determining the sources of the rise in volatility and implications. 
Model-based statistical estimates reported in Chart 3 show the Great 
Chart 2















1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005 
Annualized percentage points 
Notes: Black line: point estimate of fitted standard deviation. Shading: 70 percent confidence interval.10  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Moderation yielded a very broad-based reduction in volatility, touch-
ing all variables considered (see also Stock and Watson 2002, 2003).6   
Variability fell for final sales and inventories; all broad categories of con-
sumer spending and business investment; residential investment; net 
exports; government spending; the goods and services components of 
GDP; inflation; and interest rates. 
The statistical estimates also show that the volatilities of many ma-
jor macroeconomic indicators have recently reversed much of the Great 
Moderation (Chart 3). However, the rise in volatility is not quite as 
widespread as the Great Moderation. Volatility has risen sharply for 
goods sectors (for example, the goods components of consumption and 
GDP), measures of investment (business fixed and residential invest-
ment), and measures of inflation that include food and energy (inflation 
in the GDP price index).7 The increase in volatility has been smaller for 
Indicator Probability
GDP 95.9





Business fixed investment 99.6
Residential investment 99.2
Inventory contribution to GDP growth 63.0







Inflation: core PCE 75.1
Federal funds rate 97.5
10-year Treasury bond 62.3
Table 1
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Chart 3
ESTIMATED STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF 
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services sectors (services consumption and the services component of 
GDP), the inventories contribution to GDP growth, core inflation, 
and 10-year Treasury yields. The stability in the volatility of invento-
ries is especially noteworthy in light of the importance some research 
has placed on inventory management as an explanation for the Great 
Moderation (for example, McConnell and Perez-Quiros). Estimated 
probabilities of an increase in volatility confirm that increases in volatil-
ity are highly likely and therefore significant for goods sectors, measures 
of investment, and measures of inflation that include food and energy 
(Table 1).8
As in the case of GDP growth, the estimated changes over time in 
the model-implied standard deviations of U.S. macroeconomic indica-
tors are driven by movements in the volatility of the error term of the 
model. Although many of the estimated coefficients of the models have 
changed modestly over time, the swings in volatility shown in Chart 3 
are due to movements in the standard deviation of the shock term of 
the model.
II.   CAUSES OF THE RISE IN VOLATILITY
Determining whether the rise in macroeconomic volatility docu-
mented in the last section signals the end of the Great Moderation 
requires an assessment of the root causes of the increase in variability. 
The simple statistical model of the last section indicates the increased 
variability is due to more volatile shocks to each variable. For example, 
the volatility of GDP growth has risen because the volatility of the error 
term in the GDP equation has moved higher. This error term, though, 
reflects an array of unmodeled, fundamental forces, including shocks to 
oil prices and financial conditions. The challenge is to determine what 
fundamental factors have driven up the volatility of the error term in 
the simple GDP equation and, in turn, the volatility of GDP growth. 
If the Great Moderation has ended, it is most likely because one or 
more of the factors responsible for the Moderation is no longer at work. 
Thus, to determine why volatility has increased, the natural starting 
point is to consider the causes of the Great Moderation. This section 
begins with a brief review of the causes of the Great Moderation and 
their potential for explaining the increase  in volatility. The section then 
focuses on the most direct explanation for greater variability: bigger ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  15
shocks to oil prices, the housing sector, and financial markets. After 
describing the macroeconomic model used in the analysis, the section 
presents the results. Estimates of the model indicate most of the rise in 
the volatility of the U.S. economy can be attributed to larger shocks to 
oil prices and financial markets.
Potential causes of the Great Moderation
Most research on the causes of the Great Moderation has considered 
three broad explanations:  structural changes in the economy, improved 
monetary policy, and good luck (Stock and Watson 2002, 2003; Ce-
cchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause). Potentially important structural 
changes include improved inventory management (McConnell and Per-
ez-Quiros) and financial innovations (Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel). 
For example, market-driven financial innovations such as securitization 
made credit available to more households and firms. Increased availabil-
ity of credit may have allowed households and firms to better smooth 
out changes in spending over the course of ups and downs in the busi-
ness cycle. In addition, the elimination of ceilings on interest rates on 
bank deposits (Regulation Q) helped to stabilize the supplies of funds 
available to lenders and, in turn, borrowers.
Some economists believe volatility in the economy fell after mon-
etary policy began to respond more systematically to deviations of infla-
tion and GDP growth from desired levels, following the experience of 
high inflation in the 1970s (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler present evidence 
of a change in policy). According to Bernanke (2004), in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, policymakers eased monetary policy to stimulate the 
economy and achieve a higher level of economic activity, which boosted 
inflation. Policymakers responded by tightening policy to lower infla-
tion, which led to a sharp contraction in economic activity. In response, 
policy was eased to stimulate the economy, beginning the cycle again. 
This instability in policy added to the volatility of the economy. Starting 
in 1979, policymakers began to respond more systematically and con-
sistently to inflation and GDP growth. By the early 1980s, monetary 
policy’s responsiveness to inflation had increased to a more appropriate 
level and helped to stabilize the economy (Bernanke (2004); Clarida, 
Gali, and Gertler).16  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Yet another explanation for the Great Moderation is known as the 
“good luck” hypothesis (Stock and Watson 2002, 2003; Ahmed, Levin, 
and Wilson). According to this line of reasoning, the economy was 
highly volatile from the 1960s through the early 1980s because it was 
subject to unusually large shocks, such as dramatic increases in oil pric-
es.9 From the early 1980s until perhaps recently, the economy has been 
lucky in the sense that shocks have been much smaller. As a result, the 
economy was much less variable than during the period of large shocks.
Despite considerable research, broad agreement on the causes of the 
Great Moderation remains elusive. At least some research supports each 
of the explanations. But the evidence is far from clear-cut. For example, 
a number of studies have found that the Great Moderation is better ex-
plained by reductions in the sizes of shocks (good luck) than by changes 
in the conduct of monetary policy (Stock and Watson 2002, 2003). Yet 
some other studies have shown a significant portion of the Great Mod-
eration to be the result of changes in the conduct of monetary policy 
(Canova; Benati and Surico).
The ambiguity of the evidence on the causes of the Great Mod-
eration could in part be due to the difficulty of distinguishing what 
are truly shocks from structural aspects of the economy and policy. As 
Greenspan and others emphasized in the general discussion of Stock 
and Watson (2003) at the Jackson Hole Symposium, the small models 
commonly used to assess the Great Moderation may ascribe to unex-
plained shocks changes that in fact represent systematic responses to 
events in the economy. Greenspan argued that what changed with the 
Great Moderation was the flexibility of the economy, with better inven-
tory management, gradual deregulation, and greater flexibility of labor 
and financial markets. Several commentators suggested the conduct of 
monetary policy had also improved and lowered economic volatility (for 
example, DeLong). Small macroeconomic models, such as the one used 
later in this article, may not be rich enough to capture some changes in 
the flexibility of the economy, such as better inventory management, or 
the behavior of monetary policy. Some of the Jackson Hole commenta-
tors on Stock and Watson (2003) argued simple models attributed too 
much of the Great Moderation to smaller shocks and not enough to 
improvements in structural aspects of the economy and policy.10ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  17
Potential causes of rising volatility
Despite the absence of agreement on the causes of the Great Moder-
ation, the natural starting point for explaining the recent rise in volatility 
is to consider whether the forces that may have caused the Great Modera-
tion could have more recently reversed course. First, could past structural 
changes in inventory management or financial markets have reversed 
themselves? Probably not. It seems unlikely that there has been a sudden 
change in inventory management that could account for increased vola-
tility. In fact, the evidence in the previous section indicates the volatility 
of inventories has remained at about the Great Moderation level. An 
unwinding of structural changes in financial markets that contributed to 
the Great Moderation is also unlikely. For example, regulations such as 
ceilings on deposit interest rates (Regulation Q) have not been reinstated. 
While securitization has fallen sharply during the crisis, it has not been 
eliminated. So, at least prime borrowers continue to be able to use credit 
to smooth their spending through the business cycle. 
Similarly, changes in the response of monetary policy to economic 
activity and inflation seem unlikely to account for the recent rise in 
macroeconomic volatility. The behavior of monetary policy is widely 
viewed as having been consistent and stable from the early 1980s into 
this decade (Lubik and Schorfheide). Policy has taken unusual steps 
to respond to the sharp recession and financial crisis, but these policy 
changes occurred after the beginning of the event—not in time to have 
caused the rise in volatility. However, some observers have argued the 
decision to keep the federal funds rate target very low for too long in 
2003-2004 represented a departure from the normal behavior of policy 
that helped to sow the seeds for the housing bust and subsequent eco-
nomic crisis (Taylor). While this view could have some merit, other 
research on the conduct of policy in the early part of this decade in-
dicates that policy acted appropriately and consistently with histori-
cal norms (Elmendorf). In addition, Gertler observes that the United 
Kingdom experienced a similar housing boom and bust despite having 
maintained a significantly tighter monetary policy in 2003-2004.
Larger shocks seem to be the most promising explanation for the 
recent rise in volatility.11 There is reason to think the sharp recession and 
associated rise in volatility could be the result of some specific shocks. 
Oil prices posted record increases over the course of 2007-2008, ris-18  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ing from $54 per barrel in January 2007 to nearly $134 in June 2008. 
In some models of the relationship of GDP growth to oil prices, the 
jump in oil prices fully accounts for the recession (Hamilton 2009a,b). 
The collapse of the housing market also sharply slowed the economy 
through the direct contributions of residential investment to GDP and 
spillovers associated with consequences such as job losses in construc-
tion (Bernanke 2008, 2009). Residential investment fell more than 50 
percent from 2005:Q4 to 2009:Q2, and total employment in construc-
tion fell 16 percent over the same period. 
Finally, the crisis in financial markets that erupted in August 2007 
made financing more costly and difficult to obtain, likely reducing con-
sumer and business spending. The crisis originated with increased de-
linquencies on subprime residential mortgage loans but spread to other 
financial assets and markets, such as commercial mortgage-backed secu-
rities. Starting in August 2007, most spreads between interest rates on 
risky loans and safer loans soared. One such measure, the TED spread, 
is the difference between the 3-month London Interbank Offered Rate 
(an interbank lending rate that is risky because the loans are unsecured) 
and the 3-month Treasury yield (the safe rate). The TED spread rose 
from 0.26 percentage point at the end of January 2007 to 1.5 percent-
age point at the end of August 2007 and more than 4 percentage points 
in mid-October 2008. In the face of a high degree of aversion to risk 
and a strong desire for liquidity, credit has only been available to the 
highest-quality (lowest risk) borrowers for much of the crisis. 
The crisis in financial markets is widely viewed as a shock that con-
tributed importantly to the severity of the recession. Admittedly, though, 
to some extent the financial shock could have been made possible by 
some of the same past financial innovations that contributed to the Great 
Moderation. For example, while the increase in mortgage securitization 
may have enabled more consumers to use credit to smooth their spend-
ing over the course of business cycle, the mortgage securitization market 
suffered from various incentive problems (Ashcraft and Schuermann; 
Dugan; Keys and others). For one, mortgage originators had no obliga-
tion to hold any interest in a loan and therefore had insufficient incen-
tive to ensure the quality of the borrower.12 Many observers have blamed 
the financial crisis on these incentive problems. In addition, the Great 
Moderation could have helped to foster the shock to financial markets ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  19
by causing borrowers, lenders, and investors to underestimate risk (Car-
ney). Although the deeper causes of the financial crisis are beyond the 
scope of this article, the crisis likely constituted a shock that could have 
contributed to the rise in macroeconomic volatility.
Empirical evidence on the causes of increased volatility 
Based on such reasoning, this section uses a small macroeconomic 
model of the U.S. economy to assess the roles of shocks to oil prices, 
housing, and credit conditions in the rise of volatility. With structural 
changes in the economy or monetary policy unlikely sources of a rise in 
volatility, the regression coefficients of the model—which capture the 
structural relationships in the model—are held constant over time. But 
the variances of the shocks to the model are allowed to change from 
period to period. Accordingly, the model provides a decomposition of 
the recent rise in macroeconomic volatility into contributions from 
various shocks, including shocks to oil prices, housing, and financial 
market conditions. To the extent that shocks have become larger, the 
resulting increase in the volatility of the macroeconomy can be viewed 
as a result of bad luck. In light of the Great Moderation debate over 
difficulties in correctly disentangling shocks and structural aspects of 
the economy, a bad luck explanation will be more credible if shocks 
to oil prices, housing, or financial market conditions—shocks widely 
thought to have occurred—drive the rise in macroeconomic volatility.
Model description. The variables in the macroeconomic model in-
clude the real price of oil (the log of the spot price/GDP price index), 
inflation in the GDP price index, the growth rate of GDP excluding 
residential investment, growth of residential investment, a measure of 
financial market conditions, and the federal funds rate. In this model, 
GDP excluding residential investment is used in lieu of overall GDP to 
make it easier to disentangle shocks specific to the housing sector and 
shocks to the overall economy.13 Although housing is measured with 
just residential investment to limit the size of the model and volume of 
results to be presented, the broad findings are unchanged by the addi-
tion of housing prices to the model.14 Financial market conditions are 
measured with an index of financial stress in the United States from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), developed in Balakrishnan and 
others.15 The IMF’s stress index is based on seven financial market in-20  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
dicators, including an interbank interest rate spread, a corporate bond 
spread, stock returns, and a measure of volatility in stock returns. 
The model relates the current value of each variable to the val-
ues of all variables over the past four quarters. For example, growth in 
residential investment is a function of the past four quarters’ values of 
oil prices, inflation, GDP excluding residential investment, residential 
investment, the financial stress index, and the federal funds rate. Each 
equation includes an error term that captures shocks. For instance, the 
error in the oil price equation will capture as shocks sudden move-
ments in oil prices.16 Models of this form are commonly used in mac-
roeconomic research (for example, Jarocinski and Smets).17
To assess the roles of various shocks in accounting for the recent 
rise in volatility, the macroeconomic model simplifies some aspects of 
the single-variable model of the last section (see Appendix 2 for de-
tails). To capture changes in the volatility of the economy, the standard 
deviations of the shocks to the model are allowed to vary smoothly over 
time, taking different values each quarter. However, in contrast to the 
specification of the single-variable model, the regression coefficients 
are assumed to be constant over the estimation sample of 1985:Q1 
through 2009:Q2. Holding the regression coefficients constant is a 
practical (to make the estimation statistically tractable) requirement 
with a model having more than a few variables. Using an estimation 
sample that starts in the mid-1980s should help to ensure the regres-
sion coefficients are truly stable over time.18 For example, many econo-
mists believe the conduct of monetary policy changed in the late 1970s 
or early 1980s but has been stable since then (for example, Clarida, 
Gali, and Gertler).19 Therefore, a number of other studies have used 
the same approach of treating model coefficients as constant over a 
sample from the mid-1980s through the present (for example, Jarocin-
ski and Smets). 
The model implies the volatility of each included variable to de-
pend on all the coefficients on past values of the variables and the vari-
ances of the shocks. In this section, the model-implied volatility is re-
ported as an instantaneous variance.20 In any quarter, the instantaneous 
variance of a variable is what the variance would be for all time in the 
future if the variances of shocks and the coefficients on lagged values of 
the variables stayed at their current levels. Because the coefficients are ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  21
held constant over time, increases in instantaneous variances of the vari-
ables must result from increases in the variances of the shocks, which 
are allowed to vary over time. However, not all of the shock variances 
need to increase to drive a shift in macroeconomic volatility. The rise in 
macroeconomic volatility could be due to just a single shock variance.
Results. To determine which shocks may have driven the rise in 
macroeconomic volatility, the natural starting point is the volatilities 
of the shocks in the model. Chart 4 reports estimates of the standard 
deviations of the shocks in the model.21 The volatilities of some of the 
model’s shocks have risen significantly in recent years. For example, 
the standard deviation of oil price shocks has doubled since 2001. 
The standard deviation of shocks to financial stress has increased by 
more than 80 percent since 2005. The variability of shocks to inflation 
and residential investment has also moved significantly higher since 
the early part of this decade. In contrast, the variability of shocks to 
GDP excluding residential investment has remained essentially flat. 
Similarly, the estimated volatility of shocks to the federal funds rate has 
remained within the relatively narrow range in which it has fluctuated 
since 1985. For these two variables, the rise in volatility evident from 
the single-variable model considered in the first section must be due 
to other shocks. The macroeconomic model used in this section is de-
signed to capture such propagation over time of shocks in one variable 
to other variables—for example, the delayed influence of oil prices on 
GDP growth.
Chart 5 and Table 2 report estimates of the instantaneous variance 
of each variable implied by the estimated macroeconomic model, bro-
ken down into the estimated contributions of each source of shocks.22   
The chart provides the complete time series of variances and contribu-
tions. The height of the shaded contours gives the total variance; each 
separate contour gives the contribution from a particular shock. Wider 
contours imply larger contributions. Table 2 reports point estimates 
of the total change in variance from 2003:Q4 to 2009:Q2, along with 
shares of the change in total variance attributable to each of the model’s 
shocks.23
The estimates of instantaneous variances from the macroeconomic 
model indicate the recent rise in macroeconomic volatility is primarily 
due to increases in the variances of shocks to financial markets and oil 22  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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Note: Black line: point estimate of fitted standard deviation of each variable. 
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Chart 5
ESTIMATED VARIANCES AND VARIANCE 

















1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009
1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009



















Annualized percentage points Annualized percentage points







































































































Oil price  Inflation  GDP excluding residential investment















Oil price 0.44 75.5a 5.8a 0.3 1.5 13.2a 3.6
Inflation 2.41 14.8a 69.5a 0.4 1.7 10.1a 3.4
GDP ex res. 
inv.
7.71 33.1a 16.6a 7.2 3.5 36.5a 3.2
Res. inv. 323.31 29.4a 11.5a 1.0 29.2 26.3a 2.6
IMF stress 
index
26.72 12.5a 10.4a 0.5 3.3 71.3a 2.0
Fed funds rate 8.45 32.2a 19.7a 1.3 4.6 23.2a 19.1
Table 2
CHANGES IN ESTIMATED VARIANCE CONTRIBUTIONS 
FROM 2003:Q4 TO 2009:Q2 
Notes: The first column reports the change from 2003:Q4 to 2009:Q2 (positive numbers indicate rising variances) 
in the total variance of each variable obtained from the macroeconomic model estimates. These figures are sums 
of the posterior medians of the contributions reported in Chart 5. The remaining columns report the shares of 
the change in variance accounted for by each shock in the model. These shares are computed from the posterior 
medians of the contributions reported in Chart 5 and the total change in variance reported in the first column. A 
superscript a denotes a change in contribution that is significant in the sense that the (posterior) probability of an 
increase in the variance contribution exceeds 95 percent (note that none of the probabilities exceed 90 percent but 
not 95 percent).
prices (Chart 5, Table 2). The contributions of financial stress to the 
variabilities of growth in GDP excluding residential investment and 
growth in residential investment have risen sharply in recent quarters. 
The point estimate of the contribution of financial shocks to growth of 
GDP excluding residential investment rose by 2.81 percentage points 
from 2003:Q4 to 2009:Q2, accounting for 36.5 percent of the total 
increase in GDP variability. The estimated contribution of financial 
shocks to residential investment shot up 85.11 percentage points from 
2003:Q4 to 2009:Q2, which is 26.3 percent of the total change in 
variance for residential investment. The contributions of financial stress 
to the variances of inflation and the federal funds rate have also risen 
significantly, accounting for 10.1 and 23.2 percent, respectively, of the 
increase in volatility for these variables. The estimated probabilities of 
increases in variance due to financial market shocks exceed 95 percent, 
indicating the increases are statistically important.
The large increase in the volatility of oil prices has also significantly 
boosted the variability of GDP, residential investment, inflation, and 
the federal funds rate. The point estimate of the contribution of oil ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  25
price shocks to GDP excluding residential investment increased 2.55 
percentage points from 2003:Q4 to 2009:Q2 (33.1 percent of the total 
change in variance for GDP). The estimated contribution of oil price 
shocks to inflation rose 0.36 percentage point (14.8 percent of the total) 
for inflation. The contribution of oil shocks to the federal funds rate 
jumped 2.72 percentage points from 2003:Q4 to 2009:Q2, accounting 
for 32.2 percent of the overall rise in funds rate variability. With the 
estimated probabilities of increases in variance exceeding 95 percent, 
the changes due to oil prices are statistically significant.
Perhaps  surprisingly,  the  increased  variability  of  shocks  to  resi-
dential investment has yielded only small changes in the volatility of 
the other model variables. For example, the estimated contribution of 
housing shocks to the increased volatility of GDP excluding residential 
investment is 0.27 percentage point, or 3.5 percent of the total increase. 
But larger shocks to housing do play a role in the rising volatility of 
residential investment, pushing the estimated contribution of housing 
shocks up 94.39 percentage points from 2003:Q4 to 2009:Q2 for 29.2 
percent of the change in the overall volatility of residential investment.
Finally, the model ascribes much of the rise in the volatility of in-
flation, and some of the increase in the variability of GDP and the 
federal funds rate, to shocks to inflation. The point estimate of the con-
tribution of inflation shocks to the overall variability of inflation rose 
1.67 percentage points from 2003:Q4 to 2009:Q2, accounting for 69.5 
percent of the total change in inflation volatility. But these measured 
shocks to inflation could represent other fundamentals not included in 
the model, such as food prices or non-oil energy prices. Estimates of an 
alternative version of the model including core consumer price inflation 
instead of GDP inflation yield a much smaller role for inflation shocks.
III.   IMPLICATIONS
The  evidence  in  the  previous  two  sections  indicates  macroeco-
nomic volatility has risen significantly in recent quarters, and that the 
increase in U.S. volatility can be primarily attributed to larger shocks to 
oil prices and financial conditions. However, the increase in volatility is 
not as widespread across sectors as the Great Moderation. This section 
discusses the implications of these findings for the permanence of the 
Great Moderation and the future volatility of the economy. The section 26  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
first discusses the implications of existing evidence on the sources of the 
Great Moderation for its permanence. In that context, the section then 
turns to the implications of the recent increase in volatility.
The inconclusive evidence on the causes of the Great Moderation 
could be seen as suggesting that the Moderation was partly due to each 
of structural change, improved policy, and good luck. Any contribu-
tions from changes in economic structure and policy seem likely to 
be permanent—that is, to contribute to a permanently lower level of 
macroeconomic volatility. For example, the improvements in inventory 
management techniques introduced some years ago should be perma-
nent and have lasting benefits on the variability of production. Simi-
larly, financial innovations such as securitization will remain in place, 
making credit available to more consumers and firms (allowing them 
to smooth spending) than was the case before securitization became 
common. To be sure, the crisis may have permanently reduced the level 
of securitization, but securitization will continue to occur because it 
offers considerable benefits to financial market participants. Policymak-
ers may also enact reforms that help to preserve securitization in its 
most important forms. As a result, most observers expect securitization 
to increase after the crisis (Calomiris; Knowledge@Wharton; Penner; 
Schwarcz). Finally, the late 1970s or early 1980s shift of monetary pol-
icy toward more systematic behavior in responding to economic activ-
ity and inflation should be permanent and contribute to permanently 
lower volatility of the economy.
On the other hand, as Pescatori observes, there is no reason to 
think any portion of the Great Moderation due to good luck should be 
permanent. Good luck can turn into bad luck and cause volatility to 
rise. For example, to the extent the Great Moderation was partly due to 
fortuitously smaller shocks to energy prices, at some point in the future 
the economy could be subject to larger shocks to energy and, in turn, 
an increase in macroeconomic volatility.
Based on this reasoning, up until the recent crisis it might have been 
reasonable to believe the Moderation had permanently lowered macro-
economic volatility, but perhaps not (permanently) to levels as low as was 
experienced during a period in which luck was primarily good. Struc-
tural change and improved policy contributed to permanent reductions 
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a result, volatility was permanently lower, although not necessarily as low 
as indicated by the data for the Great Moderation period.
In such a context, what does this article’s evidence on rising volatil-
ity and its sources imply for the durability of the Great Moderation?   
The first section’s finding that the recent increase in volatility is concen-
trated in certain sectors of the economy (for example, goods produc-
tion and investment but not services components, and total inflation 
but not core) suggests the Great Moderation, which affected all sectors, 
has not come to an end. The narrower breadth of the rise in volatil-
ity is suggestive of specific shocks affecting parts of the economy—bad 
luck—rather than broad changes in structure or policy that would tend 
to affect the entire economy. The second section of this article provides 
more direct evidence that bad luck has driven the recent rise in volatil-
ity. Specifically, the second section shows that larger shocks to oil prices 
and financial conditions account for most of the increase in macroeco-
nomic volatility.24 
Accordingly, once the crisis subsides and the period of very bad luck 
passes, macroeconomic volatility will likely decline. In the future, the 
permanence of structural change and improved monetary policy that 
occurred in years past should ensure that low volatility is the norm. 
That level of volatility may not be quite as low as during the Great 
Moderation, when good luck consistently prevailed. However, as recent 
events have shown, the volatility of shocks hitting the economy will 
likely vary over time. During occasional periods of bad luck, macro-
economic volatility could rise significantly. Therefore, over time, mac-
roeconomic volatility seems likely to undergo occasional shifts between 
high and low levels, with low volatility the norm.
Such changes in volatility have implications for assessments of risk 
by all decision makers. For example, risk premia incorporated in lend-
ing rates should take account of the potential for occasional periods 
of higher-than-normal economic volatility that could produce steeper-
than-normal recessions. Were a relatively steep recession to occur, loan 
delinquency rates could rise significantly. The interest rates charged on 
the loans should reflect the small probabilities of such outcomes. On 
a more positive note, the recognition by financial market participants 
that volatility can turn up from time to time could make the financial 28  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
system less prone to booms and busts associated with periods of extreme 
optimism and pessimism (Carney).
As another, related example, shifts over time in volatility imply the 
uncertainty surrounding macroeconomic forecasts also changes over 
time. Such changes in uncertainty will need to be reflected in the mea-
sures of forecast uncertainty reported by many central banks. Some cen-
tral banks publish fan charts showing probabilities of outcomes. The 
Federal Reserve publishes discussions of uncertainty in the periodic 
Summary of Economic Projections included in the minutes of meetings 
of the Federal Open Market Committee. All such central bank reports 
on forecast uncertainty will need to take account of variation over time 
in macroeconomic volatility.
As a final example, household decisions on savings should take ac-
count of the potential effects of an occasional steeper-than-normal reces-
sion on their income, job situations, and wealth. As recent events have 
highlighted, severe downturns can eliminate jobs normally thought safe 
and cause asset values and wealth to plummet. Some consumers will 
want to consider saving more in the event of such rainy days.
IV.   CONCLUSIONS
The severity of the recession that started in late 2007 has led some 
observers to conclude the Great Moderation—a period of low macro-
economic volatility that began in the United States in the mid-1980s 
—is over. The recession was the worst in the post-war period, producing 
an unprecedented decline in economic activity. 
This article examines whether the Great Moderation is over. Es-
timates in the article show the volatilities of GDP growth and many 
(not all) sectors of the U.S. economy have reversed much of the Great 
Moderation. A statistical examination of potential causes of the rise in 
the volatility of the economy points to larger shocks to oil prices and fi-
nancial markets. The article concludes that, over time, macroeconomic 
volatility will likely undergo occasional shifts between high and low lev-ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  29
els, with low volatility the norm. In this sense, the Great Moderation 
is not over.
APPENDIX  1
This appendix provides estimates of changes in GDP growth vola-
tility for other G7 economies, based on data through 2009:Q2 and 
the statistical model used in the first section of the article.25 These 
statistical estimates show that the volatilities of many G7 economies 
have reversed much of the Great Moderation (Chart A1). The Great 
Moderation produced significant reductions in volatilities in all econo-
mies, sometimes fairly suddenly (as in the United Kingdom and Japan) 
and sometimes more gradually (as in the other countries). However, 
recent events have caused the estimates of volatility to move higher in 
all countries, some much more than others. The rise in volatility has 
been especially sharp for Germany and Japan. The United Kingdom 
and Italy have also experienced dramatic increases in variability. The 
rise in volatility has been more muted for Canada and France. Statisti-
cally estimated probabilities that the instantaneous standard deviation 
of GDP growth is higher in 2009:Q2 than in 2003:Q4 confirm the 
significance of the increase in volatility. For all countries, the probabil-
ity of a rise in volatility is 95 percent or more.30  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart A1
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APPENDIX  2
This appendix details, in technical terms, the statistical models and 
estimation methodology used in the article. 
Single-variable model specification
The univariate model is an autoregression (AR) with time-varying 
coefficients and stochastic volatility. Letting 
€ 
yt denote the variable of 
interest measured in quarter t, the model takes the form:
€ 




εt are independent shocks; 
€ 
htis the instantaneous error 
variance. With the 
€ 
βt coefficients stacked in a vector 
€ 
Bt, the model can 
be rewritten as: 







Xt is a stacked vector containing all of the right-hand-side vari-
ables (the constant and the lags of 
€ 
yt). 
The time variation in coefficients and variances is modeled with 
random walk processes, which relate current values to last period’s val-
ues plus a shock. The time variation of the model parameters is gov-
erned by the following equations:
     
€ 
Bt= Bt−1 + ut
loght = loght−1 + nt.
All of the innovations in the model are assumed to follow joint nor-
mal distributions, with independence among 
€ 
εt, ut, and 
€ 
nt.  
The instantaneous standard deviations reported in the article are 
functions of the time-varying coefficients and error variances. For each 
period t, these instantaneous variance estimates are obtained by (1) re-
writing the estimated AR(4) model as a first-order vector autoregressive 
(VAR(1)) process with coefficient matrix 
€ 
Ct (where the first row of 
€ 
Ct 
contains the AR coefficients
€ 
βt and the other elements are ones or zeros) 
and error variance matrix 
€ 
Σt (the first element is 
€ 
ht and the other ele-
ments are zeros), and (2) solving the equation 
€ 
Vt = CtVtCt'+Σt for 
€ 
Vt, 
where the first element of 
€ 
Vt contains the instantaneous variance of 
€ 
yt 
(see Hamilton (1994), pp. 259-66).2632  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Single-variable model estimation
The univariate model is estimated with the Bayesian methodology 
detailed in such sources as Cogley and Sargent and Primiceri. The sam-
ple period is 1961:Q2 to 2009:Q2 in the G7 analysis and 1960:Q1 to 
2009:Q2 in the U.S. analysis. Bayesian estimation combines prior dis-
tributions for all coefficients with the likelihood to obtain posterior dis-
tributions. Markov chain Monte Carlo methods are used to simulate the 
posterior distributions from prior distributions that are normal or invert-
ed Wishart. The reported estimates are based on 10,000 draws obtained 
by first generating 10,000 burn-in draws and then saving every fifth draw 
from another 50,000 draws.
The priors use estimates from 10 years of data preceding the esti-
mation sample (a training sample). In the analysis of U.S. variables, the 
training sample is 1950:Q1 through 1959:Q4. In the analysis of G7 
data, only for the United States and France is GDP data available for 10 
years preceding the estimation starting point of 1961:Q2. Accordingly, 
in all other G7 estimates, the training sample estimates are taken from 
estimates for GDP growth in the United States from 1951:Q2 through 
1961:Q1. The prior mean and variance of the initial value of the AR coef-
ficients (
€ 
B0) are set to the training sample’s least squares estimates of the 
coefficients and four times their variance, respectively. The prior mean of 
the log of the initial value of the instantaneous error variance, 
€ 
h0, is set 
to the log of the residual variance from the pre-sample estimate; the prior 
variance is set to 4.0. 
The priors on the amount of time variation in the coefficients and 
the error variance reflect an expectation that some time variation is likely. 
The (inverted Wishart)  prior for the variance of 
€ 
ut, the shocks to the AR 
coefficients, uses a mean of 0.001 times the variance of the least squares 
estimates from the training sample, with 10 degrees of freedom. The (in-
verted Wishart)  prior for the variance of 
€ 
nt, the shock to the log vari-
ance, uses a mean of .002 and 5 degrees of freedom (so the Wishart scale 
matrix is .002 × 5).
Modifications of the priors described above did not change the quali-
tative results presented in the article. These modifications included the 
following, implemented separately: (1) tightening the variance on the 
initial value of volatility to 0.5 (from 4.0); (2) raising the scaling factor 
controlling the time variation in coefficients to 0.005 (from 0.001); (3) ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  33
lowering the scaling factor controlling the time variation in coefficients 
to 0.0005 (from 0.001) and raising the degrees of freedom to 20; (4) 
lowering the prior mean on time variation in volatility to 0.005 (from 
0.02); and (5) raising the prior mean on time variation in volatility to 
0.05 (from 0.02).
Multi-variable macroeconomic model specification
The macroeconomic model is a VAR with constant regression coef-
ficients and stochastic volatility.27 In light of the evidence in such stud-
ies as Levin and Piger of shifts in trend inflation, the model incorpo-
rates the steady state specification developed by Villani. Let 
€ 
yt denote 
the vector of variables measured in quarter t: the log of the real price of 
oil, inflation, growth in real GDP excluding residential investment, etc. 
Let 
€ 
dt denote the vector of deterministic variables used to capture the 
long-run means of each variable: a constant and a dummy variable with 
value 1 from 1991 onward (per the dating of Levin and Piger) and 0 in 
previous periods. Let 
€ 






a 6 × 2 matrix of coefficients on the deterministic variables. The model 
takes the form:
             
€ 
β(L)(yt −ψdt) = A
−1Ht
.5εt, var(εt) = I
  A =
1 0 0 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0 0 0
a31 a32 1 0 0 0
a41 a42 a43 1 0 0
a51 a52 a53 a54 1 0
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The errors 
€ 
εt are independent structural shocks, identified from a re-





The components of 
€ 
Ht are instantaneous error variances. Under the order-
ing of variables in
€ 
yt, a shock to oil prices, for example, can have an immedi-
ate impact on GDP growth, but a shock to GDP growth can only affect oil 
prices with a one-period delay. 
The time variation in the variances of 
€ 
Ht is modeled with random 
walk processes, which relate current values to last period’s values plus a 
shock. For notational convenience, let 
€ 
htdenote a vector containing all 




Ht. The time variation of the 
log variances is governed by the following equations:
                                 
€ 
loght = loght−1 + nt.
All of the innovations in the model are assumed to follow joint nor-





The instantaneous variances and variance contributions reported in 




A) and error variances (
€ 
Ht). For each period t, these instan-
taneous variance estimates are obtained from a 100-step ahead variance 
decomposition (see, for example, Hamilton (1994), pp. 323-24).
Multi-variable macroeconomic model estimation
The  multi-variable  model  is  estimated  with  Bayesian  methodol-
ogy, combining portions of the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithms 
of Villani and Cogley and Sargent. The sample period is 1985:Q1 to 
2009:Q2. The reported estimates are based on 5,000 draws, obtained by 
first generating 20,000 burn-in draws and then saving every fifth draw 
from another 25,000 draws. As detailed below, the priors required in the 
estimation use some estimates taken from 15 years of data preceding the 
estimation sample (a training sample of 1970:Q1 through 1984:Q4).28 
As suggested by Del Negro, an informative prior is applied to the 
VAR coefficients in order to reduce problems with explosive autoregres-
sive roots. The prior takes a Minneapolis form, with prior means of 0 
on all coefficients and prior standard deviations controlled by the usual 
hyperparameters, with overall tightness of 0.5, cross-equation tightness 
of 0.5, and linear decay in the lags. The variable standard deviations that 
enter the Minneapolis prior are taken from AR(4) models fit to each ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  35
variable over the training sample. In the case of the priors on the deter-
ministic variables, for simplicity the priors are based on simple means 
and standard deviations of the series over the estimation sample. For 
all variables except inflation and the federal funds rate, the prior on the 
coefficients of the dummy variable has a mean of zero with a very, very 
tight standard deviation to effectively rule out mean shifts. The prior 
for the coefficients of the Choleski matrix 
€ 
A is normal and uninforma-
tive, with a mean of zero for each element and a variance of 10002 (and 
covariances of zero across coefficients).
The priors on the amount of time variation of 
€ 
Ht reflect an expec-
tation that some time variation is likely. The prior mean of the initial 
value of the log variances, 
€ 
h0, is set to the log of OLS estimates of AR(4) 
residual variances from the training sample; the prior variance is set to 
4 times an identity matrix. The (inverted Wishart)  prior for the vari-
ance of
€ 
ni,t, the vector of shocks to the log variances for equation i, uses 
a mean of .002 and 5 degrees of freedom (so the Wishart scale matrix is 
.010 for each variance).
Modifications of the priors described above did not change the quali-
tative results reported in the article. These modifications included the fol-
lowing, implemented separately:  (1) tightening the variance on the initial 
value of volatility to 0.5 × I (from 4.0 × I); (2) lowering the prior mean on 
time variation in volatility to 0.005 (from 0.02); and (3) raising the prior 
mean on time variation in volatility to 0.05 (from 0.02).36  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1The quarterly growth rates used in Chart 1 and all subsequent analysis are 
annualized log growth rates.
2Another statistical formulation that allows volatility to vary over time is a 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. Ca-
narella and others estimate GARCH models for GDP growth in the United States 
and United Kingdom with data through 2007 and conclude that the Great Mod-
eration is over. However, based on just data through 2007, the models used in this 
article do not yield a material rise in volatility.
3For illustrative purposes, suppose the coefficients β0,t=β2,t=β3,t=β4,t=0, such 
that the model simplifies to an (time-varying) AR(1) process. In this case, the in-







, where σt denotes the standard devia-
tion of the model error et in quarter t. 
4Consistent with the timing suggested by the raw data plotted in Chart 1, 
model estimates obtained for data samples ending at different dates indicate the 
rise in volatility is driven primarily—although not entirely–by data for 2008:Q4 
and 2009:Q1. GDP growth volatility begins to turn up with model estimates ob-
tained for data through 2007:Q4. The sharpest increase in volatility occurs when 
the model is estimated with data through 2008:Q4 or 2009:Q1. Nonetheless, 
these model estimates indicate volatility began to rise in 2006. This earlier timing 
may be due to the smoothing of volatility changes by the model, which is designed 
to capture gradual changes.
5The Bayesian statistical methodology used to estimate the models makes 
such probabilities natural and easy to compute. In each case, the reported proba-
bility is the percentage of posterior draws in which volatility is higher in 2009:Q2 
than in 2003:Q4.
6All measures of spending are expressed in real (not nominal) terms, based on 
data released after the July 31, 2009, benchmark revision of the GDP accounts 
(obtained from the FAME database of the Board of Governors in early September 
2009).
7While not reported in the interest of brevity, the rise in volatility is evident 
for investment split into the equipment-software and structures components and 
for total PCE inflation.
8The probability of an increase in volatility is lower for consumption and its 
components than for GDP or investment.
9While it is widely believed that large oil price movements reflect supply 
shocks with significant effects on the U.S. macroeconomy, some research, sum-
marized in Kilian, has shown that the movements in oil prices are at least partly 
the result of demand forces and responses to macroeconomic developments. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  37
10Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin make the same point and show that, in 
large models, shocks play a smaller role in accounting for the Great Moderation. 
Benati and Surico find that empirical models commonly used to assess the roles 
of shocks versus policy in the Great Moderation will routinely attribute to shocks 
changes that in truth are due to policy.
11Canarella and others argue that a rise in volatility is unlikely to be the result 
of changes (from good to bad) in policy or inventory management.
12However, Schwarcz argues the originate-to-distribute problem likely played 
little role in the crisis.
13The simple treatment of housing represents an important source of uncer-
tainty in the conclusions. Shocks to housing supply and demand may have played 
different roles in the recent rise in volatility. However, the model used in this 
section does not distinguish supply and demand shocks, because it would be very 
difficult to do so in a model that allows variation over time in the variances of the 
shocks. Jarocinski and Smets use sign restrictions to identify shocks to housing 
supply and demand. For computational tractability, the model of time-varying 
volatilities used in this article requires that shocks be identified from a Choleski 
decomposition.
14In light of the need for data back to at least 1985, the house price series 
used in the robustness analysis was the repeat sales index from the Federal Hous-
ing Finance Agency. Alternatives such as the Case-Shiller index from Standard 
and Poor’s are not available that far back in time.
15The stress index of Hakkio and Keeton has some advantages over the IMF 
index, but the available data series starts too late (1990) to permit usage in this 
section, which requires data back to 1985. Measuring financial market condi-
tions with a spread between medium-risk, long-maturity corporate bond yields 
and 10-year Treasury yields developed by Gilchrist, Ortiz, and Zakrajsek yields 
results qualitatively similar to the reported results based on the IMF stress index. 
This spread is intended as a measure of the premium firms must pay to finance 
projects with credit instead of internal funds. Gilchrist, Ortiz, and Zakrajsek ar-
gue this spread better captures credit supply shocks than do alternatives such as 
the spread between Baa and Aaa bond yields. Historically, the spread has a very 
strong association with changes in GDP, business investment, and other measures 
of economic activity. Using this interest rate spread in lieu of the financial stress 
index gives a modestly larger role to financial market shocks in the recent rise in 
macroeconomic volatility.
16Shocks to oil prices, residential investment, and the other variables are 
identified on the basis of a Choleski ordering, with the variables ordered as listed 
in the description of the model. In the case of oil prices, Kilian argues for iden-
tifying energy shocks by ordering oil prices first in the model. Monetary policy 
shocks are commonly measured by placing the federal funds rate after indicators 
of inflation and economic activity (see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, 38  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
and Evans). GDP excluding residential investment appears before residential in-
vestment because there is likely to be some lag between the onset of a housing-
specific shock and its spillover to the rest of the economy. In contrast, an overall 
shock to the economy should, by definition, immediately affect both residential 
investment and GDP excluding residential investment. Therefore, a shock that 
contemporaneously affects both residential investment and GDP excluding resi-
dential investment is treated as an aggregate shock and captured by the Choleski-
orthogonalized shock to GDP excluding residential investment. For the other 
variables, the appropriate ordering is less clear. However, the results presented are 
robust to alternative orderings of the variables.
17This article’s model both generalizes (by allowing time-varying volatility) 
and simplifies (by including fewer variables and a less sophisticated identification 
scheme) the model Jarocinski and Smets use to analyze the role of housing in the 
macroeconomy.
18For example, Clark and Terry show the impact of energy prices on the 
economy fell by the mid-1980s but remained largely constant thereafter.
19Not all economists agree. For example, Sims and Zha present evidence that 
the conduct of monetary policy has been largely constant over time, while the 
sizes of shocks have changed significantly.
20In this section, the fitted volatilities are variances instead of standard devia-
tions to simplify breakdowns into contributions. The fitted variance is the sum of 
the contributions. But the fitted standard deviation is not the sum of the standard 
deviations of the contributions (it is the square root of the sum of variances of 
the contributions).
21The chart reports the standard deviations of the structural shocks obtained 
from the Choleski decomposition, rather than the reduced-form shocks.
22The estimates are obtained from 100-step ahead forecast error variance de-
compositions. The 100-step horizon is long enough that the estimated variances 
effectively correspond to the fitted variances. The reported figures are posterior 
medians. 
23The total variances and shares in the table are based on the posterior me-
dian contributions. Medians of shares computed from the posterior distribution 
of shares are quite similar.
24Admittedly, what is less clear is the extent to which these larger estimated 
shocks are truly just shocks or partly reflect structural changes in the global econ-
omy. Some might argue the measured shocks to oil prices and financial market 
conditions that largely account for the rise in the volatility of the U.S. economy 
are truly just shocks. Others might view the measured shocks as partly stemming 
from structural changes in, for example, global energy markets or past innova-
tions in financial markets. But it seems likely that the measured increase in the 
sizes of the shocks reflects true changes in the size of shocks, and in turn, the 
return of some bad luck.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  39
25Data on G7 GDP are taken from the FAME database of the Federal Re-
serve Board of Governors (all the FAME-source data are chain-weighted). For all 
countries except the United States, United Kingdom, and France, the sample of 
GDP growth rates was extended back to 1960 with GDP data from the OECD.
26Common econometric software packages have built-in commands for solv-
ing the equation. An alternative, equivalent approach is to use the solution given 
in equation (11) of Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent.
27Clark and Clark and Davig use similar models.
28The available data on the IMF stress index do not go all the way back to 1970. 
For the training sample estimation, the stress index is filled in – for the period 1970 
to 1979—with a series that sums a prediction of the stress index based on related 
financial market variables available during the period with a simulated error.40  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
REFERENCES
Ahmed, Shaghil, Andrew Levin, and Beth Anne Wilson. 2004. “Recent U.S. 
Macroeconomic Stability: Good Policies, Good Practices, or Good Luck?” 
Review of Economics and Statistics, August.
Ashcraft, Adam B., and Til Schuermann. 2008. “Understanding the Securitiza-
tion of Subprime Mortgage Credit,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff 
Report no. 318, March.
Balakrishnan, Ravi, Stephan Danninger, Selim Elekdag, and Irina Tytell. 2009. 
“The Transmission of Financial Stress from Advanced to Emerging Econo-
mies,” IMF Working Paper No. 09/133.
Benati, Luca, and Paolo Surico. 2009. “VAR Analysis and the Great Modera-
tion,” American Economic Review, September.
Bernanke, Ben S. 2009. “The Crisis and the Policy Response,” Stamp Lecture at 
the London School of Economics, London, England, January 13.
Bernanke, Ben S. 2008. “Current Economic and Financial Conditions,” speech 
at the National Association for Business Economics 50th Annual Meeting, 
Washington, DC, October 7.
Bernanke, Ben S. 2004. “The Great Moderation,” remarks at the meetings of the 
Eastern Economic Association, Washington, DC, February 20.
Blanchard, Olivier, and John Simon. 2001. “The Long and Large Decline in U.S. 
Output Volatility,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1.
Calomiris, Charles W. 2008. “The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, 
and What’s Next,” in Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System, 
a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August 
21-23.
Canarella, Giorgio, WenShwo Fang, Stephen M. Miller, and Stephen K. Pollard. 
2008. “Is the Great Moderation Ending?  UK and US Evidence,” manu-
script, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
Canova, Fabio. 2009. “What Explains the Great Moderation in the U.S.?  A 
Structural Analysis,” Journal of the European Economic Association, June.
Carney, Mark. 2009. “Some Considerations on Using Monetary Policy to Stabi-
lize Economic Activity,” Remarks at the Jackson Hole Symposium, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August 22.
Cecchetti, Stephen G., Alfonso Flores-Lagunes, and Stefan Krause. 2006. “Assess-
ing the Sources of Changes in the Volatility of Real Growth, NBER Working 
Paper No. 11946.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans. 1996. “The 
Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks:  Evidence from the Flow of Funds,” Re-
view of Economics and Statistics, February.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler. 2000. “Monetary Policy Rules 
and Macroeconomic Stability:  Evidence and Some Theory,” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, February.
Clark, Todd E. 2009. “Real-Time Density Forecasts from VARs with Stochastic 
Volatility,” Research Working Paper 2009-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Kan-
sas City.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2009  41
Clark, Todd E., and Troy Davig. 2009. “Decomposing the Declining Volatility of 
Long-Term Inflation Expectations,” Research Working Paper 2009-05, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Clark, Todd E., and Stephen J. Terry. 2009. “Time Variation in the Inflation 
Passthrough of Energy Prices,” Research Working Paper 2009-06, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Kansas City.
Cogley, Timothy, and Thomas J. Sargent. 2005. “Drifts and Volatilities:  Monetary 
Policies and Outcomes in the post WWII US,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 
April.
Cogley, Timothy, Giorgio E. Primiceri, and Thomas J. Sargent. 2009. “Inflation-
Gap Persistence in the U.S.,” American Economic Journal:  Macroeconomics, 
forthcoming.
DeLong, J. Bradford. “Commentary:  Has the Business Cycle Changed?  Evidence 
and Explanations,” in Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Chang-
ing Economy,  a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City,  August 28-30.
Del Negro, Marco. 2003. “Discussion of Cogley and Sargent’s ‘Drifts and Volatili-
ties: Monetary Policy and Outcomes in the Post WWII US,’” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2003-26.
Dugan, John C. 2007. “Remarks Before the Annual Convention of the American 
Bankers Association,” San Diego, October 8.
Dynan, Karen E., Douglas W. Elmendorf, and Daniel E. Sichel. 2006. “Can Fi-
nancial Innovation Help to Explain the Reduced Volatility of Economic Ac-
tivity?”  Journal of Monetary Economics, January.
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 2003. Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: 
Adapting to a Changing Economy,  a symposium sponsored by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City,  August 28-30. 
Gertler, Mark. 2009. “Discussion of ‘Financial Crises and Economic Activity by 
S. Cecchetti, M. Kohler, and C. Upper’,’’ in Financial Stability and Macroeco-
nomic Policy, a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City,  August 20-22.
Giannone, Domenico, Michele Lenza, and Lucrezia Reichlin. 2008. “Explaining 
the Great Moderation:  It Is Not the Shocks,” ECB Working Paper No. 865. 
Gilchrist, Simon, Alberto Ortiz, and Egon Zakrajsek. 2009. “Credit Risk and the 
Macroeconomy:  Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model,” manuscript, 
Boston University. 
Hakkio, Craig S., and William R. Keeton. 2009. “Financial Stress:  What Is It, 
How Can It Be Measured, and Why Does It Matter?” Economic Review, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Second Quarter. 
Hamilton, James D. 2009a. “Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-
08,” manuscript, University of California-San Diego.
Hamilton, James D. 2009b. “Oil Prices and the Economic Downturn,” Testimony 
prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, May 20.
Hamilton, James D. 1994. Time Series Analysis, Princeton University Press:  Princ-
eton, New Jersey.
Jarocinski, Marek, and Frank R. Smets. 2008. “House Prices and the Stance of 
Monetary Policy,” Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, July/
August.42  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Keys, Benjamin J., Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig. 2008. “Did 
Securitization  Lead  to  Lax  Screening?  Evidence  from  Subprime  Loans,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Kilian, Lutz. 2008. “The Economic Effects of Energy Price Shocks,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, December.
Kim, Chang-Jin, and Charles Nelson. 1999. “Has the U.S. Economy Become 
More Stable?  A Bayesian Approach Based on a Markov-Switching Model of 
the Business Cycle,” Review of Economics and Statistics, November.
Knowledge@Wharton. 2008. “Coming Soon ... Securitization with a New, Im-
proved (and Perhaps Safer) Face,” April 2, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.
edu/article.cfm?articleid=1933.
Levin, Andrew, and Jeremy Piger. 2006. “Is Inflation Persistence Intrinsic in In-
dustrial Economies?” manuscript, University of Oregon.
Lubik, Thomas A., and Frank Schorfheide. 2004. “Testing for Indeterminacy: An 
Application to U.S. Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review, March.
McConnell, Margaret M., and Gabriel Perez-Quiros. 2000. “Output Fluctua-
tions in the United States: What Has Changed Since the Early 1980s?” 
American Economic Review, December.
Penner, Ethan. 2008. “The Future of Securitization,” Wall Street Journal, July 10.
Pescatori, Andrea. 2008. “The Great Moderation: Good Luck, Good Policy, or 
Less  Oil  Dependence?”  Economic  Commentary,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Cleveland, March.
Primiceri, Giorgio. 2005. “Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and 
Monetary Policy,” Review of Economic Studies, July.
Schwarcz, Steven L. 2008. “The Future of Securitization,” Duke Public Law & 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 223, November.
Sims, Christopher A., and Tao Zha. 2006. “Were There Regime Switches in US 
Monetary Policy?” American Economic Review, March.
Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 2003. “Has the Business Cycle Changed?   
Evidence and Explanations,” in Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to 
a Changing Economy,  a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City,  August 28-30.
Stock, James H. 2002. “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?” NBER Mac-
roeconomics Annual. 
Taylor, John B. 2009. “The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses:  An Empir-
ical Analysis of What Went Wrong,” National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 14631, January.
Villani, Mattias. 2009. “Steady-State Priors for Vector Autoregressions,” Journal 
of Applied Econometrics, June/July.